Introducing complead. One AI-native platform for financial crime compliance. Read the story
New Ready Integrations available Check the new integrations

Hawala: how the informal transfer system works and its risks

In short

Hawala is a way of sending money abroad through brokers called hawaladars: the sender's broker takes the cash, a partner broker in the other country pays the recipient from its own funds, and the two settle the debt later. As of October 2026, FATF Recommendation 14 asks countries to license or register such operators, and the US, UK, EU and UAE ban unlicensed ones.

The question an examiner asks is why a grocery store's account takes cash from many people every day and sends round sums to a trading company in Dubai. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), in its 2013 report on hawala and similar service providers, found that over 90 percent of New York filings on possible unregistered money services businesses "involved convenience/grocery stores and the Middle East" (p. 57). Hawala sits among the money laundering methods supervisors track, and the broker can be an ordinary shop.

 

What does hawala mean, and who is a hawaladar?

Hawala means a transfer of money through a network of brokers rather than through banks, though FATF found in 2013 that the term has "no common definition" across countries (p. 12). In South Asia and the Middle East it names a centuries old system often used to finance trade. A hawaladar is the broker: FATF defines it as "a money transmitter that provides hawala services" (p. 16). FinCEN's advisories use a wider term, informal value transfer systems (IVTS) (p. 57).

FATF groups these brokers with similar providers, "described using a variety of specific terms, including hawala, hundi, and underground banking", which "settle through trade, cash, and net settlement over a long period of time" (p. 9). They are not, FATF adds, the "global money transfer networks" of large multinational transmitters. FATF sorts them into three types, each with its own risks: pure traditional (legitimate), hybrid traditional (often unwitting) and criminal (complicit). In practice, they "often have detailed records" and "are not necessarily based upon trust" (p. 10).

 

How does a hawala payment work?

Table 1. One hawala transfer, step by step (illustrative: 1,000 pounds from London to Lahore).

Step What happens What money moves Record left
1. Pay in The sender hands hawaladar A in London 1,000 pounds and a fee, and gets a code Cash stays in London A's ledger line
2. Instruction A tells hawaladar B in Lahore the amount, the recipient and the code None A call or a chat message
3. Payout The recipient quotes the code; B pays the rupee amount from its own cash B's local cash B's ledger line
4. Settlement Weeks later, A and B settle what they owe each other A net transfer, goods, cash or a third party payment Bank or trade records, if any

No money crosses the border at step 1 or step 3. In net settlement, the brokers pay from their local cash pools and, after a set period such as a month, settle only the net amount owed; about 80 percent of the countries FATF surveyed called this the most common method (p. 16). Debts are also cleared through reverse transfers, triangular settlement through a third broker, settlement through goods, which can shade into trade based money laundering, and cash couriers.

A bank transfer is different. It travels as a payment message, for example over SWIFT, carrying who sent the money and who receives it, data the travel rule requires on licensed transfers. A hawala payout carries no such message.

 

Is hawala legal or illegal around the world?

Table 2. Hawala rules by jurisdiction (as of October 2026).

Jurisdiction Rule What an operator needs If it operates without
FATF standard Recommendation 14 (updated June 2026) A license or registration; agents licensed or listed Countries should "apply appropriate sanctions"
United States 31 CFR 1022.380; 18 U.S.C. 1960 FinCEN registration as a money services business (MSB) within 180 days, renewed every two calendar years, plus any state license A fine, up to 5 years in prison, or both, under 1960
United Kingdom MLR 2017 reg 56 and reg 54 Inclusion in the register of money service businesses, kept by HMRC or, for authorized firms, the FCA It "must not act" as a money service business
European Union PSD2 Article 37 Authorization as a payment service provider; money remittance is a payment service Member states "shall prohibit" it
United Arab Emirates CBUAE Registered Hawala Providers Regulation (in force since 14 June 2019) A Hawala Provider Certificate and a UAE bank account for settlement Article 2 bars the activity

Across this global regulatory response, the offense is running the service without a license or registration, whatever the method. A bank that already holds a license to transfer money needs no second one (FATF's note to Recommendation 14).

In the US, the line between a lawful hawaladar and a criminal one is the license and the registration: one with its state license and a FinCEN registration as a money services business is a regulated money transmitter, while one missing either commits a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. 1960, even if it did not know a state license was required and every customer is a worker sending wages home.

 

Why is hawala a financial crime and sanctions evasion risk?

What changed in 2026: on 25 October, India's Directorate of Enforcement (ED) reported searches in Mizoram and Manipur against a narco hawala network that settled drug money with suppliers in Myanmar. It froze 1,424 bank accounts, secured over Rs 26 crore in assets and arrested six people under the PMLA. One mini ATM counter had made 2,947 transfers worth Rs 175.03 crore between 2024 and June 2026, and the money ended with unlicensed rupee to kyat exchangers.

The risks follow from how the system is built:

  • Hidden proceeds. FATF's survey found people choose hawala for price, speed, cultural preference, a lack of bank access and low confidence in banks, and also for the "deliberate transfer or concealment of criminal proceeds" (p. 10).
  • Sanctions evasion. Criminal providers "mask the identity of the ultimate originator" from the banks that wire the funds (p. 39); FATF's US cases include transfers to Iran in breach of OFAC sanctions (p. 66).
  • Little regulatory oversight. Most countries FATF surveyed had sanctions for unlicensed transmitters, yet few appeared to have used them (p. 55).
  • No message to screen. A payout without a payment message gives screening and monitoring nothing to read.
  • Criminal networks. One set of accounts can serve many groups: the ED found the same accounts settling drug money from Manipur, Mizoram, Assam and Tripura.

Check the country at the other end of a transfer.

The free AML Country Risk Index from complead, formerly Sanction Scanner, gives every jurisdiction one financial crime risk score from 0 to 100, drawn from its FATF status, the Basel AML Index and sanctions intensity, and refreshes as those sources publish.

800+companies use complead
80+countries served

 

How can compliance teams detect hawala activity?

Hawala reaches a bank through the broker's accounts, so detection looks for an unlicensed money business inside an ordinary account. FATF's indicators (pp. 57 to 58) and the ED case give a checklist:

  1. Collective accounts. Many small deposits from different people, then one large transfer abroad: the cash pool of step 1.
  2. Round transfers at regular intervals to a hub such as Dubai: the settlement of step 4.
  3. A temporary repository. Money in and straight out again, with no business reason.
  4. Third party accounts with no business link to the hawaladar or the sender.
  5. Rented accounts. In the ED case, Rs 11.98 crore went into seven accounts and only Rs 17 lakh came out in cash, the pattern of a money mule account.
  6. Turnover far above income. A homemaker's account took Rs 15.48 crore against a family income of about Rs 27,000 a month.
  7. Amounts kept under customer identification or transaction reporting thresholds, a form of structuring.

Mitigation starts at onboarding: an AML program's know your customer (KYC) and customer due diligence (CDD) checks on any business that sends money for others include its license or registration. After that, transaction monitoring in complead, formerly Sanction Scanner, runs payment scenarios such as corridor volume and rapid pass through, close to indicators 2 and 3 above, and each alert opens as a case with the customer's rating, screening and ownership attached. An analyst decides whether it goes to a report.

Back at the grocery account, the analyst asks for two things: the money services registration and the trade behind the transfers to Dubai. With neither on file, the account goes to a suspicious activity report decision.

Related terms

  • Structuring. Breaking deposits or transfers into amounts below a reporting threshold.
  • Money mule. A person whose account moves criminal money for someone else.
  • Travel rule. The duty to send sender and recipient data with a transfer.
  • Trade based money laundering. Moving value through false invoices and shipments.
  • Black market peso exchange. Brokers swapping drug dollars in the US for pesos paid out in Colombia.
  • Front company. A real business used to hide criminal money inside its turnover.

Lead on compliance.

Join 800+ companies that trust complead to detect risk, prevent fraud and stay compliant.

One Platformall compliance, risk & fraud requirements in a platform

How this entry was checked. Checked on 26 October 2026 against FATF Recommendation 14 and its note (June 2026 text), FATF's report on the role of hawala and other similar service providers (October 2013), 31 CFR 1022.380, 18 U.S.C. 1960, the UK Money Laundering Regulations 2017 (regulations 54 and 56), PSD2 Article 37, the CBUAE Registered Hawala Providers Regulation and India's Directorate of Enforcement release of 25 October 2026. The definition follows FATF's description of hawala and other similar service providers. Barbaros Sercan (Customer Success Specialist, complead) drafted the entry; the review is by Dilara Diker, Head of Compliance at complead. Last reviewed: 26 October 2026.

Frequently asked questions

What is hawala?

Hawala is a way of sending money abroad through brokers called hawaladars, who pay the recipient from local cash and settle with each other later. FATF groups it with hundi and underground banking as services that settle through trade, cash and net settlement.

Is hawala illegal?

Hawala is legal only where the operator holds the license or registration the country requires, as FATF Recommendation 14 asks. In the US, the UK, the EU and the UAE, running it without one is prohibited, and in the US it is a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. 1960.

Why do people use hawala instead of banks?

The pros in FATF's 2013 report are competitive pricing, faster money transmission, cultural preference, and access where banks are missing or have lost people's confidence. The cons follow from the same features, which attract criminals who want to hide proceeds or evade currency controls, sanctions and taxes.

What is hundi?

Hundi is a regional name for the same kind of service: FATF's 2013 report lists hawala, hundi and underground banking as terms for providers that settle through trade, cash and net settlement over a long period. Like hawala, it is lawful only where the operator holds the license or registration its country requires.

Who detects hawala transactions?

Banks detect the accounts hawaladars use, through customer due diligence at onboarding and transaction monitoring afterwards, and decide whether to file a suspicious activity report. Supervisors and law enforcement then act on unregistered operators, as India's Directorate of Enforcement did in October 2026, when it froze 1,424 bank accounts.

Is hawala the same as a money transfer service?

No. FATF separates hawala and similar providers from the global money transfer networks of large multinational transmitters: hawala brokers pay from local cash and settle later through trade, cash or net settlement, while a licensed transfer service moves the payment with sender and recipient data attached.

Barbaros Sercan
Written by Barbaros Sercan Customer Success Specialist

Barbaros Sercan is Customer Success Specialist at complead, working with existing customers on support, account health and growth. Before complead, Barbaros was an account manager at SEM and worked in digital client management at Forward Media Turkey. Barbaros writes about AML compliance, sanctions screening and financial crime trends.

Originally published , updated

Back to knowledge base