the same customer investigated
Two teams open two cases on one person and neither knows.
Fraud teams and AML teams investigate the same customer from opposite ends. Fusion puts both signal sets on one record — and one decision.
Fusion is the point; the feeds either side of it are the inputs.
Fraud sees behaviour and no list context. AML sees lists and no behaviour. Each closes a case the other would have escalated, and the disagreement only surfaces when a regulator reads both files.
Two teams open two cases on one person and neither knows.
Behaviour without list exposure, and lists without behaviour.
The escalation path forks and the audit trail forks with it.
Transaction behaviour and screening results attach to the same resolved customer.
Velocity, device and network signals weigh alongside PEP status and list exposure.
Where the two disciplines diverge, the case is raised rather than closed by whichever ran first.
Fraud and AML work the same record, and the export contains both perspectives.
Combining disciplines is encouraged. Combining them into something you cannot explain is not.
Read the compliance guidesFraud and AML each ran their own queue on the same customer base. One shared entity record and one score removed the duplication and, more usefully, surfaced the cases where the two views disagreed.
No. Each score decomposes into the contributing signals, their source and their weight — that is the point of it.
Fusion needs at least two feeds to be worth anything. Most teams start with screening and add fraud signals.
Whichever team the escalation rules name, with the other able to contribute to the same record.
They accept models they can interrogate. Version, basis, decision log and override path are all retained.
Send a month of fraud and AML outcomes on the same customers. The divergences are usually the interesting part.